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COiMxNTS
This language seems to indicate the court's awareness of the consti-
tutional limitations involved when women are denied the right to serve
as jurors-both as to the woman denied the right and to the litigant
before the court.
C. Michael Buxton
CimnAL LAw-BAm-i-lGr TO BAmI iN CA~rrAL CASES AF=E FioR
BEvOCATION.-Appellant was arrested for murder in Clay County, Ken-
tucky, on September 5, 1968, and admitted to $10,000 bail in Clay
Circuit Court on September 8, 1968. Thereafter an indictment for will-
ful murder, a capital crime in Kentucky,' was returned by the Clay
County Grand Jury and the appellant was arraigned. By agreement
between the appellant and the Commonwealth of Kentucky, venue of
the pending prosecution was changed to Knox Circuit Court for the
purpose of trial. In early February, 1969, the Knox Circuit Judge
caused the appellant to appear before him and ordered his bail re-
voked. Appellant then filed a new motion for bail which was over-
ruled after an evidentiary hearing not unfavorable to him. After this
decision the appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
which was dismissed. The appellant then appealed this dismissal.
Held: Reversed. Where appellant, charged with willful murder, had
remained on bail of $10,000 set by one judge from September, 1968,
until February, 1969, without indication that he conducted himself
in any manner other than that required by law, he was entitled to bail
from another judge, after change of venue, in a reasonable amount,
but not to exceed the amount previously fixed. Marcum v. Broughton,
442 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. 1969).
There have been very few decisions handed down by the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals on this aspect of bail; indeed, the broad sub-
ject itself has been treated on relatively few, but significant, oc-
casions. Bail in Kentucky is based upon the State Constitution which
reads in part:
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient securities, unless for
capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption
great;2 and the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
suspended unless when, in the case of rebellion or invasion, the
public safety may require it.3
1I KENTruczY lEvisE STATUTES [hereinafter KRS] § 435.010 (1962).
2 This has been construed to mean the proof of guilt is evident or the pre-
sumption of guilt is great. Day v. Caudill, 300 S.W.2d 45, 46 (Ky. 1957); Com-
monwealth v. Stahl, 237 Ky. 388, 35 S.W.2d 563 (1931).
a KENTrucKy CoNsTrrrUrON § 16. This mandate has been recognized by the
Court of Appeals in many cases including Smiddy v. Barlow, 288 S.W.2d 346
(Continued on next page)
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In the Marcum case, habeas corpus procedure was of no small im-
port because in Kentucky a habeas corpus proceeding must be in-
stituted to review the denial of bail by a circuit court.4 An appeal is
not allowed because an order entered on a motion for bail is not a
final order5 and no appeal may be taken therefrom.6 An appeal may
only be taken from a final judgment, except on behalf of the Com-
monwealth.7
Having dispensed with the subsidiary problem of procedure to
appeal a bail denial, the Court proceeded to distinguish several cases
somewhat in point.
In Young v. Russells the defendant was indicted and admitted
to bail. Four days later, on motion of the Commonwealth, the bail
was revoked. It was held that such an order admitting a defendant to
bail may be vacated after bail is taken so as to recommit the defendant
on new evidence of his guilt even though the defendant acted in no
way contrary to the conditions of the bail during the period. This
ruling seems to be in direct conflict with the general rule:
[.. An] order granting bail is final and res judicata as to all
questions pertaining to release on bail, except the amount. After
the right has once been determined by an order in favor of the
accused, the question has been regarded as closed, so as to prevent
reopening thereof in order to permit the prosecution to introduce
evidence in rebuttal of that offered by the applicant. 9
The Court in by-passing this general rule concluded in Young, after
an exhaustive exploration of its ancestory, that Ex parte Augustine, °
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(Ky. 1956). It was written in this case: "A person accused of crime for which he
might suffer the death penalty has the right to remain at liberty upon reasonable
bail pending trial unless the Commonwealth shows his manifest guilt or produces
evidence sufficient to create great presumption of guilt." Id. at 347.4 Day v. Skinner, 300 S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1957); Burton v. Commonwealth,
307 Ky. 825, 212 S.W.2d 310 (1948); Wells v. Commonwealth, 299 Ky. 51, 184
S.W.2d 223 (1944); Smith v. Henson, 298 Ky. 182, 182 S.W.2d 666 (1944).
5 Smith v. Henson, 298 Ky. 182, 182 S.W.2d 666 (1944). The writ of
habeas corpus is available to one who is imprisoned when by law he is entitled to
bail, and the code permits an application for the writ of habeas corpus to be
made before the judge of the circuit court in which the applicant is indicted.
Hacker v. Commonwealth, 288 Ky. 222, 155 S.W.2d 867 (1941). For an ex-
haustive discussion of habeas corpus in bail proceedings see Smith v. Henson,
supra.
6A writ of habeas corpus will ordinarily not be granted when there is another
available remedy; no appeal being allowed in bail proceedings, this writ is the
only remedy. Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 86, 165 S.W.2d 993 (1942);
Stonefield v. Buchanan, 289 Ky. 386, 158 S.W.2d 970 (1942).
7 Wylie v. Commonwealth, 184 Ky. 14, 211 S.W. 190 (1919); Riley v.
Commonwealth, 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1406, 55 S.W. 7 (1900).
8332 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. 1960).
9 8 Am. Jur. 2D Bail and Recognizance § 93 (1963). See also 8 C.J.S. Bail §
47 (1962).
10 33 Tex. Cr. R. 1, 23 S.W. 689, 47 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1893).
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its fundamental parent, "... stands on a mere ipse dixit, and is not
supported by the authorities cited therein. . . .11 [Thus] it is clear
that... Ex parte Augustine, a wayward and fertile ghost ... ought
to be laid to rest."12
In the Young case, having given one rule life and laid another to
rest, the Court proceeded to reverse the lower court on the basis that
the Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden13 to show that the
defendant's guilt was evident or the presumption thereof was great.14
In many jurisdictions the burden is on the defendant to show that he
is entitled to bail;15 in Kentucky, however, the burden is on the Com-
monwealth to show he is not.'6
In Kentucky it is well established that the judge who conducts a
hearing on a proceeding of the nature presented in the principle case
is "vested with a sound discretion" in determining whether the burden
has been sustained. His decision will not be disturbed on appeal un-
less he has clearly abused his discretion.' 7 This idea has been phrased
as follows:
[If] it appears from a review of the record that there is room for
an honest difference of opinion among reasonable men as to
whether the 'proof is evident or the presumption great,' this court
will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.' 8
In Finn v. McClard,19 the above policies were brought together and
discussed and later referred to in Marcum as the "rule of the Finn
case."
2 0
Evidence as to the appellant's probable guilt of willful murder in
the principle case was also reviewed. In Kentucky, only proof that is
competent under the ordinary rules of evidence may be used in bail
11Young v. Russell, 332 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. 1960), citing Ex parte
Marshall, 38 Ariz. 424, 300 P. 1011 (1931).
12Young v. Russell, 332 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Ky. 1960).
13 The ruling of the judge was supported only by the hearsay evidence of a
police officer as to what the sole eyewitness told him and by the official transcript
of the testimony given by the eyewitness before the Grand jury, neither of which
was considered competent evidence.
14Young v. Russell, 332 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. 1960); Day v. Caudill, 300
S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1957).
15 R. ANDEisoN, WrIiAToN's CnmmiNr. LAW AND PROCEDurE 651 (Vol. 4
1957); 8 Am. Jun. 2D Bail and Recognizance § 52 (1963).
1 Young v. Russell, 332 S.W.2d 629 (Ky. 1960); Day v. Skinner, 300
S.W.2d 48 (Ky. 1957); Commonwealth v. Staid, 237 Ky. 388, 35 S.W.2d 563
(1931).
17Brooks v. Gaw, 346 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. 1961); Wells v. Commonwealth,
299 Ky. 51, 184 S.W.2d 223 (1944).
18 Nickell v. Kelly, 357 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1962).
10 418 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1967).
20 Marcum v. Broughton, 442 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Ky. 1969). It is called the
rule of the Finn case, although Finn v. McClard, 418 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1967),
relied almost wholly upon Nickell v. Kelly, 357 S.W.2d 856 (Ky. 1962).
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proceedings; 21 therefore grand jury minutes may not be used,22 but
eyewitness testimony 23 or positive identification by the victim him-
self24 has been held acceptable to support a denial of bail. In Marcum
the appellant was accused of murdering his brother, but testimony by
his sister-in-law25 gave some degree of plausibility to the inference
that the homicide was committed in self-defense or under unusual
strain. It has been held in Day v. CaudilP26 and Burton -). Common-
wealth27 that where conflicting evidence creates such a plausible basis
for self-defense or the reduction of the offense to a noncapital degree,
the Commonwealth has not amply sustained its burden of proof and
the accused cannot constitutionally be refused reasonable bail.
The Court in the instant case believed that the fact situation more
closely resembled Day and Burton and differed from Young, Nickell
and Finn. In one respect, however, it differed radically from them
all-and this is the crux of the whole decision. In Marcum the judge
who denied bail after his revocation of previously allowed bail was
not acting in an initial fashion. He revoked bail which had already
been allowed by a judge who had opportunity to hear evidence and
testimony while it was unfettered by time. Vested with the same dis-
cretion and aware that bail has been traditionally instituted to
guarantee pre-trial freedom with assurances of appearance at trial, 28
the second judge showed a marked deviation from the discretion of
the first, especially since the fact was apparent that for approximately
six months before revocation of bail the appellant was free from im-
prisonment and acting in no way contrary to the law. Nevertheless,
the Court said it would be impelled to uphold the Knox Circuit Judge
in the exercise of his discretion had he been the initial decision-maker.
The Court intimated that the rule of the Finn case, which stated that
the Court would seldom reverse a judge in his discretionary denial of
bail, 29 would be applicable to this situation in any normal circum-
stance. This, however, was no normal circumstance. The change in
venue and subsequent revocation and denial of bail by one judge
after another judge had previously allowed it assured its abnormality.
It would seem in retrospect that the Court in Marcum further
clarified the rights of an accused to bail in capital cases. The rule
21 See Young v. Russell, 332 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Ky. 1960); Commonwealth
v. Stahl, 237 Ky. 388, 35 S.W.2d 563 (1931).22 Young v. Russell, 332 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Ky. 1960).
23 Brooks v. Gaw, 346 S.W.2d 543 (Ky. 1961).24 Finn v. McClard, 418 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Ky. 1967).
25 Marcum v. Broughton, 442 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Ky. 1969).
26 300 S.W.2d 45 (Ky. 1957).
27 307 Ky. 825, 212 S.W.2d 310 (1948).
28 8 Am. Jum. 2D Bail and Recognizance § 4 (1963).29 Finn v. McClard, 418 S.W.2d 764 (Ky. 1967). See also note 20, supra.
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mentioned as the "rule of the Finn case" was wisely limited only to
those situations where the judge was the initial decision-maker.
It is not hard to perceive the awkward and confusing position of
an accused who is first allowed, and then denied, bail because of a
change in judges. The integrity of the judicial system might also be
somewhat impaired when judges of equal rank and each "vested with
sound discretion" are allowed to reverse each other after hearing
essentially the same facts as to probable guilt.
It is not to be denied that an accused who acts in such a manner
as to be a menace to society or who is deemed unlikely to appear for
trial should have his bail revoked and further bail denied. This, how-
ever, was not the case in Marcum for there was no indication that the
appellant acted in any way other than that prescribed by law while
awaiting trial.
In conclusion it should be said that the Court in Marcum took
another wise step in securing the freedom of the citizens of the Com-
monwealth from arbitrary intrusions. Section 16 of the Kentucky
Constitution assures the right to bail. Section 2 likewise declares that
absolute and arbitrary power over the liberty of free men exists now-
where in a republic, not even the largest majority. The Court has af-
firmed and applied each of these provisions and has clarified and
secured the position of the individual under them.
Mark Stephen Pitt
TORTS-NEGLiGENCE-ExcuLPATORY CLAusE.-As a result of her diabetic
condition, plaintiffs leg was amputated in 1965. Three years later
upon applying to defendant Rehabilitation Center for instruction in
the use of an artificial limb, plaintiff was accepted as a "candidate"
for rehabilitation. However, as a condition of her acceptance, she, like
all other patients of the Rehabilitation Center, was forced to sign an
exculpatory agreement1 which released the hospital from liability for
its own negligence. 2 After this formality was satisfied, actual therapy
was begun, and during the third treatment her stump was severely
l'Exculpatory-clearing or tending to clear from alleged fault or guilt;
excusing." Br.LcK's LAw DiCTIONARY 675 (4th ed. 1951). There are three types
of exculpatory clauses. The exemption clause which is found in the present case
provides that the exculpated party is not liable for any clause whatsoever. Second,
there is a release whereby the releasing party waives all claims. Third, the
releasing party covenants not to sue for any claim. Smith, Contractual Controls
of Damages in Commercial Transactions, 12 HAs=xTcs L.J. 122 (1960).2 The agreement provided:
I further agree that, I will assume all risks which have been explained to
me in detail that result from diagnosis and treatment. I will not assert any
claim against the Center, its employees, or its volunteers that results
from unintentional acts or conduct on their part.
